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ABSTRACT
This essay, written for a symposium on insider trading in the Washington
University Journal of Law and Policy, explores the different paths taken
by the United States and the European Union with respect to who is
subject to the prohibition on insider trading. After providing an overview
of the difference between the U.S. and the E.U. prohibition, the essay
explores the different outcomes that would occur under U.S. versus E.U.
law in several high profile insider trading cases of recent years. The
essay also addresses the jurisdictional reach of each regime’s
prohibition and considers the normative lessons of this real world
experiment in taking different paths.

* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
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My introduction to the prohibition on insider trading came as a law student in
Berkeley in 1976. My notes indicated that the law in the United States—-we did
not think much about law outside the United States—-was uncertain regarding
whom the prohibition reached. They also pointed out, however, that authority
from the Second Circuit, particularly the landmark decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulfur,1 stated that the prohibition reached anyone in possession of material
nonpublic information. Four years later, the United States Supreme Court, in
Chiarella v. United States,2 held this was wrong. Instead, the Supreme Court
redirected the prohibition on insider trading under United States law into a
narrower and more complex approach.
One wonders what would have happened if the Supreme Court had seen
things differently and upheld the Second Circuit’s broad prohibition in Chiarella.
A utility of comparative law is that it sometimes allows us to explore the impacts
of different choices regarding legal rules without performing a gedanken
experiment, searching the multiverse for another Earth on which this particular
law is different, or watching the movie Sliding Doors as made by lawyers. The
European Union’s adoption of a rule similar to the Second Circuit’s preChiarella approach makes this one of those times.
This essay explores the different paths taken by the U.S. and the E.U. with
respect to who is subject to the prohibition on insider trading. Part I provides an
overview of the different approaches taken by the U.S. and the E.U. law. Part II
moves from the general to the specific by exploring the different outcomes that
would occur under U.S. versus E.U. law in several high profile cases of recent
years. Part III explores a practical implication of this divergence by discussing
the jurisdictional reach of each regime’s prohibition. Finally, Part IV considers
what normative lessons we can draw from this real world experiment in taking
different paths.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. VERSUS E.U. INSIDER TRADING PROHIBITIONS
A. The U.S. Prohibition
Early in the 1960s, the United States established what appears to be the
world’s first prohibition of trading on inside information.3 The Securities and
Exchange Commission held that the Cady, Roberts brokerage firm had
committed fraud in violation of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act,4 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated by the Commission pursuant to that section,5
1. 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
2. 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
3. E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Insider Trading Prohibitions, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW.
63, 64-5 (2002).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2010).
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when the firm sold stock in a corporation after getting advance word from a
director that the corporation was cutting its dividend.6
For most of the next two decades, the law remained uncertain regarding who
was subject to the prohibition on insider trading under U.S. law. Cady, Roberts
and decisions from the Second Circuit suggested, however, that the prohibition
could reach anyone in possession of material information to which the public
lacked access. Specifically, Cady, Roberts explained that the obligation to
disclose or abstain was not limited to traditional categories of insiders (officers,
directors and controlling shareholders), but rather arose from a relationship
giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended only to be available
for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, coupled with
the unfairness of one party taking advantage of information that he or she knows
is unavailable to those with whom he or she is dealing. Similarly, in condemning
the trading on inside information in Texas Gulf Sulfur, the Second Circuit
explained that the policy of Rule 10b-5 is to protect the expectation that all
investors have relatively equal access to material information, and stated that
‘‘anyone in possession of material inside information’’ must disclose the
information or abstain from trading.7
In its 1980 decision in Chiarella, the Supreme Court upended this broad
view. Chiarella worked for a financial printing company and, based upon
information obtained through his job, purchased the stock of companies targeted
for tender offers by the printing company’s customers. He was found guilty of
violating the U.S. prohibition on insider trading by a jury who, consistent with
the approach in the Second Circuit, were instructed to convict simply if they
found Chiarella traded on material nonpublic information.8 The Supreme Court
reversed the conviction, holding that there was no duty to disclose or abstain
simply because one has material information not publically available.9
If mere possession of material nonpublic information is insufficient to create
a duty to refrain from buying or selling stock without disclosing what one knows,
then the inevitable question becomes what if anything creates such a duty. To
answer this question, the Supreme Court in Chiarella came up with a rationale
that the Supreme Court would later refer to as the “traditional” or “classical”
theory.10 Under this theory, because corporate insiders have a fiduciary
relationship with their company’s shareholders, they commit fraud if they trade
in their own company’s stock without disclosing to their shareholders material
nonpublic information.11 Since Chiarella did not work for the companies whose
stock he bought—rather he worked for a printing company, which, in turn,
6. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
7. 401 F.2d at 848.
8. 445 U.S. at 236.
9. Id. at 235.
10. U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997).
11. 445 U.S. at 228-230.
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worked for parties planning to buy stock in the companies whose stock he
purchased—his purchases did not come within this classical theory.
This classical theory does not explain Cady, Roberts, in which the brokerage
firm traded on information coming from an insider, but was not itself an insider.
The Supreme Court filled this gap in SEC v. Dirks.12 In Dirks, the Supreme Court
reasoned that, since it is illegal for an insider to profit by trading on inside
information, it is also illegal for the insider to profit by passing on information
for another person’s use in trading—thereby accomplishing indirectly what the
insider cannot legally do directly. Hence, tipping is illegal when a party, who
cannot legally trade, receives some personal benefit (such as a payment or even
the ability to make a gift without spending money) from providing inside
information for another person’s trading.13 If the recipient of the information (the
tippee) knows or should have known he or she received the information illegally,
then the tippee would be liable for participating in the insider’s breach if the
tippee trades.14
Finally, in 1997, the Supreme Court completed the basic edifice for the U.S.
insider trading prohibition when, in U.S. v O’Hagan,15 the court accepted the socalled misappropriation theory. Under this theory, parties commit fraud in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security when they trade on non-public
material information obtained in a deceptive manner—most commonly through
the pretence that the trader could be trusted not to abuse information received in
confidence (such as through a fiduciary relationship).
B. The E.U. Prohibition
While various European nations gradually followed the United States in
prohibiting insider trading,16 it was not until 1989 that the European Union
directed all member nations of the E.U. to prohibit such activity. The 1989 E.U.
directive on insider trading17 was not radically different from U.S. law. It
required member nations to prohibit trading by persons who gain inside
information through management or board positions with, or by being a
shareholder of, the issuer, or through their employment, profession or duties.18
While lacking the overarching reference to fiduciary relationships undergirding
the U.S. law, the E.U. categories largely picked up the same sort of insiders and
parties misappropriating information reached by the U.S. prohibition. The
12. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
13. Id. at 659-664.
14. Id. at 659-660.
15. 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997).
16. See note 3 supra.
17. Council Directive 89/592 of November 13, 1989 Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing, 1989
O.J. (L 334) 30.
18. Id. at art. 2(1).
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principal difference between the 1989 directive and U.S. law involved the
liability of parties who receive information from insiders (tippees). Under the
1989 directive, parties who received information from anyone who could not
trade also could not trade19—thereby adopting the sort of tainted fruit approach to
tippee liability that the U.S. Supreme Court rejected by establishing the personal
benefit test in Dirks.
In 2003, the E.U. issued a new directive (the Market Abuse Directive, or
“MAD”),20 which dealt, among other things, with insider trading. While MAD
took a very different approach, it is possible to miss the significant change in a
quick reading. This is because Article 2 of MAD retained the same categories of
persons prohibited from trading on inside information by the 1989 insider trading
directive; except that Article 2 of MAD added a new category—those obtaining
information from criminal activities—thereby adopting the broad
misappropriation theory advocated by Justice Berger in Chiarella.21 The critical
change occurred in Article 4. It abandoned the tainted fruit approach to tippee
liability found in the 1989 directive and replaced it with a broad prohibition
reminiscent of the Second Circuit’s pre-Chiarella approach. Specifically, Article
4 directed member nations of the European Union to prohibit trading on inside
information by anyone “who possesses inside information while that person
knows, or ought to have known, that it is inside information.”22 The result is to
reduce the impact of Article 2’s categories simply into a question of culpable
intent: persons in Article 2’s categories need not know or should have known that
they are trading on inside information, whereas anyone outside of the categories
must have such knowledge or negligence.
Last year, E.U. law changed again. The Market Abuse Regulation
(“MAR”)23 replaced MAD. A key difference is that a regulation under E.U. law
is directly binding law, whereas a directive is an instruction to member nations of
the European Union as to what their national laws must contain.24 While there are
other differences between MAD and MAR, MAR’s insider trading prohibition,
the essential scope of which is defined in Article 8, remained the same as
MAD’s. Hence, European law is pretty much what the law in the United States
appeared to be when I was in law school.
19. Id. at art. 4.
20. Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider
dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16.
21. 445 U.S. at 241-242 (Berger, C.J. dissenting)(Section 10(b) should be read to prohibit use of
information obtained by “unlawful means”).
22. “Inside information” does not mean that the information came from sources inside the corporation.
Rather it is information that has not been made public. MAD, supra note 20, at art. 1(1).
23. European Parliament and Council (EU) Regulation 596/2014 on market abuse (market abuse
regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission
Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 1.
24. E.g., Ralph H Folsom, Ralph B. Lake & Ved P. Nanda, EUROPEAN UNION LAW AFTER MAASTRICHT:
A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR LAWYERS OUTSIDE THE COMMON MARKET 5 (1996).
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II. THE IMPACT OF THE DIFFERENCE AS ILLUSTRATED IN CASES
To fully appreciate the difference in the U.S. and E.U. approaches, it is
helpful to compare the results they produce in some relatively recent high profile
cases.
A. Cuban and Einhorn
The actions brought by the SEC against Mark Cuban25 and by the English
Financial Services Authority (FSA) against David Einhorn26 provide a powerful
illustration of the different results under the U.S. and E.U. insider trading
prohibitions. The conduct in both cases was remarkably similar. In both, CEOs
contacted a large shareholder (Cuban) or the manager of a large institutional
shareholder (Einhorn, who managed the Greenlight fund) to solicit support for
planned stock offerings to raise money for their corporations. Both Cuban and
Einhorn objected to the respective offerings, and, when unable to persuade the
CEOs to change plans, dumped the shareholders’ stock in the corporations prior
to announcement of the stock offerings. In both instances, the corporation’s stock
sank upon announcement of the offering, meaning that Cuban’s and Einhorn’s
decisions to trade prior to public announcement of the stock offerings avoided
substantial losses.
The SEC proceeded against Cuban based upon the misappropriation theory.
Specifically, the SEC alleged that Cuban gained details regarding a proposed
stock offering by Mamma.com by promising its CEO that Cuban would not trade
before the offering, and then, in breach of the CEO’s trust created by this
promise, Cuban sold his Mamma.com stock. Ultimately, while an appellate court
found the SEC’s complaint alleged a viable claim,27 the SEC was unable to
convince a jury that Cuban had, in fact, promised not to trade.28 As a result, there
was no violation of the U.S. insider trading prohibition.
In the Einhorn case, there was no claim that Einhorn promised not to trade.
Indeed, when an investment banker acting on behalf of the English company,
Punch, contacted Greenlight and requested its agreement not to trade, Einhorn
explicitly refused to have Greenlight agree. Nevertheless the investment banker
set up a call between Einhorn and Punch’s CEO with the understanding that

25. See SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010).
26. Financial Services Authority, Decision Notice (January 12, 2012), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/decisions/dn-einhorn-greenlight.pdf; Financial Services Authority, Final
Notice (February 15, 2012), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/final/greenlight-capital.pdf.
27. See note 25 supra.
28. E.g., Erin Fuchs, Why the SEC Lost its Big Case against Mark Cuban, BUSINESS INSIDER (October
17, 2013), available at http://www.businessinsider.com/how-mark-cuban-defeated-the-sec-2013-10 (but also
noting testimony disputing whether information was material and not publicly known).
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Greenlight had not agreed to abstain from trading.29 Punch’s CEO discussed with
Einhorn the possibility of a stock issuance, but declined to provide details unless
Greenlight agreed not to trade for a week (by which time Punch presumably
would have publicly announced the stock issuance). Einhorn again refused and
the conversation ended.30 Immediately after the conversation, Einhorn ordered
Greenlight to sell all its shares in Punch.
It seems clear that Greenlight’s sales would not have violated U.S. law. The
effort to get Greenlight’s agreement not to trade shows that Punch’s CEO was
not tipping Einhorn in order to gain some personal benefit from passing on the
information for trading. Einhorn’s refusal to agree not to trade shows that
Einhorn did not misappropriate the information from Punch through pretence that
he could be trusted with the information. Nor did Einhorn misappropriate the
information from Greenlight, since Greenlight, not Einhorn, traded. Einhorn was
not an officer, director or other fiduciary of Punch. Perhaps one could argue that
Greenlight’s large shareholdings in Punch (13 percent) made Greenlight a
fiduciary. However, there is no indication that Greenlight exercised any control
over Punch; indeed Einhorn expressed strong opposition to Punch issuing stock
during his conversation with Punch’s CEO, which advice the CEO blithely
ignored. Moreover, the efforts of Punch’s CEO to gain Greenlight’s agreement
not to trade and refusal to provide further details about the proposed issuance
without such an agreement suggest that the CEO did not view the conversation as
providing information to a controlling shareholder in confidence.31
In 2012, Einhorn found out that English law is different when the FSA
imposed a £3.6 million fine on Einhorn and Greenlight. Much of the FSA’s
discussion in the notice of the fine focused on whether the information Einhorn
received in the phone call (given its lack of details) constituted price sensitive
(material) non-public information. As far as whether there was any duty not to
trade on inside information, the FSA relied on the fact that Einhorn received the
information as a result of his employment managing Greenlight.32 This seems
strange, since Einhorn did not personally trade in violation of any duty to
Greenlight; rather he ordered Greenlight to trade. In other words, Einhorn
violated English law because he used information received as part of his job with

29. FSA Final Notice supra note 27 at ¶ 3.21
30. Id at Annex 2.
31. If Punch had been a company registered under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, Punch’s selective
disclosures might have violated SEC’s Regulation FD (17 CFR 243.100-243.103); but this is not Einhorn or
Greenlight’s violation. Alternatively, if Punch had been registered under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act,
Greenlight’s thirteen percent holdings in Punch would have subjected it to Section 16(b) of that Act (15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(b)). This would have required Greenlight to turn over to Punch the losses Greenlight avoided by its sale
of Punch stock; but only for the number of shares, if any, that Greenlight purchased both after becoming a 10
percent shareholder and within six months of the sale. E.g. Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities
Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976) (purchase that puts shareholder over the 10 percent threshold does not count as a
purchase or sale within six months under Section 16(b)).
32. FSA Final Notice supra note 26 at ¶ 4.5.
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Greenlight in order to carry out his job by using the information on Greenlight’s
behalf.
For our purposes, however, what is important is not the strangeness of the
theory asserted by the FSA, but rather what the result would be under MAD and
MAR.33 It is clear that Einhorn was aware that he was in possession of material
non-public information, which, as stated above, makes trading illegal under
MAD and MAR. And, of course, if the undisputed lack of any agreement to
abstain from trading would not save Einhorn, the jury’s apparent finding that
Cuban did not make such an agreement would not have saved Cuban had E.U.
law applied.
B. Newman
United States v. Newman34 was a prosecution of a pair of hedge fund
managers, who had their funds trade based upon advance knowledge of NVIDIA
and Dell earnings reports obtained through a chain of tips. Specifically, insiders
at NVIDIA and Dell leaked advance information regarding corporate earnings to
casual friends—in one case a person the insider knew through business school
and prior employment and in the other case a person the insider knew through
attending the same church—who, in turn, passed the information through a chain
of stock analysts until the information reached the defendants.
In a much remarked upon decision, the Second Circuit reversed the
defendants’ convictions for illegal insider trading. In a highly controversial part
of its decision—the continued validity of which is questionable after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Salman v. United States35—the Second Circuit held that
motivation by mere casual friendship for the tippee was not a sufficient benefit to
make the tip illegal under Dirks.36 Of more certain continuing relevance, the
court also found insufficient proof that the defendants, who received the
information only after it passed through a chain of tips, knew anything about the
motivations of the insiders at the beginning of the chain.37 Thus, the defendants
did not knowingly aid a breach of the insiders’ duty.38
By contrast, finding illegality in the Newman situation would have been
pretty straightforward under MAD or MAR. Even under the 1989 insider trading
33. It is not clear why the FSA invoked the bizarre theory it did instead of relying on more relevant
provisions of English law.
34. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
35. 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
36. 773 F.3d at 452.
37. Id. at 453-454.
38. In addition, the government’s case faced another formidable challenge under U.S. law, which the
court overlooked. Since the defendants were at the end of a chain of tipping between them and the insiders,
conviction under Dirks presumably should have required some sort of showing of benefit from all the
intermediate tipping as well as the defendants’ knowledge that all of the intermediate tips were illegal. Franklin
A. Gevurtz, The Overlooked Daisy Chain Problem in Salman, 58 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 18 (2017).
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directive, trading on non-public material information traceable to corporate
employees would have been illegal without regard to any personal benefit to the
employees from providing the tip. Under MAD and MAR, it is not even
necessary that the information be traceable to corporate insiders. Nor are the
motivations of the participants in the chain of tipping, much less the defendants’
knowledge of any of this, relevant. Instead, the only question in the Newman
situation would be whether the information was not public and whether the
defendants realized or should have realized the information was not public. Well,
duh: This was advance knowledge of corporate earnings reports before the
reports were released to the public. Even if the defendants were unaware of the
route and motivations by which the information reached them, they had to realize
the earnings reports were not yet public knowledge.
III. THE JURISDICTIONAL REACH OF THE U.S. AND E.U. INSIDER TRADING LAWS
The difference between the U.S. and E.U. insider trading prohibitions raises a
question of practical consequence: Whose law governs specific instances of
insider trading in increasingly globalized securities markets?
In Morrison v. Australia National Bank,39 the Supreme Court sought to
establish a rule that would provide a simple answer to this question. The court
held that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 only reach purchases or sales of securities
that take place in the United States. Under this approach, whether the U.S. versus
the E.U. insider trading prohibition applies would depend upon whether the trade
took place on an exchange in the United States or in the European Union.
Life, however, is not so simple. For one thing, it can be challenging to
establish the country in which transactions occur when the transactions do not
take place over an exchange.40 Moreover, Congress subsequently acted to
overturn Morrison when it comes to government prosecutions for violating
Section 10(b). Specifically, the Dodd-Frank Act grants jurisdiction to U.S. courts
over government prosecutions of securities frauds (which is what insider trading
is considered to be41) in which conduct constituting a significant step in the
furtherance of the fraud occurs in the United States or conduct outside the United
States has a foreseeable substantial effect in the United States.42 How such a test

39. 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010).
40. See, e.g., Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60 (2d Cir.
2012)(adopting a test for locating non-exchange sales).
41. See notes 4 through 6 and accompanying text supra.
42. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 929P(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1376. The reference to “jurisdiction,” rather than to whether the acts violate Section
10(b), creates an issue as to whether this provision actually succeeds in overturning Morrison for government
prosecutions. E.g., Richard W. Painter, The Dodd-Frank Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provision: Was it
Effective, Needed or Sufficient?, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 195 (2011).
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applies to cases of insider trading is unclear and presumably depends upon the
facts of the individual case.43
In any event, we must also consider the reach of E.U. law. Unlike Morrison,
the touchstone for MAR’s application is not where the purchase or sale takes
place. Rather, the touchstone for MAR’s application is the relationship of the
transaction to financial instruments—such as stocks, bonds, options, derivative
contracts or the like44—traded on European exchanges.45 Specifically, MAR
reaches any insider trading in financial instruments traded on European markets,
even if the trades made on the basis of inside information do not occur on a
European exchange (as, for instance, with dual listed stocks or with private
transactions in listed shares).46 MAR explicitly states that it does not matter
whether the actions or omissions concerning the financial instruments covered by
the regulation take place inside or outside of the European Union.47
Even more broadly, MAR also applies to transactions in financial
instruments not traded on European exchanges when the prices or values of those
instruments depends on or can affect the prices or values of financial instruments
traded on European markets.48 This could pick up insider trading in American
Depository Receipts (ADRs) or options for stocks traded on European markets
even though the ADRs or options were traded in the United States. This could
also pick up insider trading in stocks on U.S. exchanges if the companies issuing
the stocks listed other securities, such as bonds, for trading in European
markets.49
The end result is to create the prospect for overlap between the jurisdictional
reach of the U.S. and E.U. law. While in private litigation this raises a choice-oflaw issue in which the court must pick one law or the other, in government
prosecutions—which are the predominant enforcement mechanism for insider
trading50—either or both nations might prosecute under their law unless some
doctrine prevents this. There are several possible doctrines to consider.
United States courts invoke a presumption against extraterritorial application

43. See id. at 216-220 (discussing possible insider trading prosecutions pursuant to Dodd-Frank’s
jurisdictional provision.)
44. Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in
financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU, 2014 O.J. L (173) 349,
Annex I, sec. C.
45. This includes so-called regulated, as well as multilateral and organized, exchanges in the E.U. MAR,
supra note 23, at art. 2(1)(a)-(c).
46. Id.
47. Id. at (4).
48. Id. at (1)(d).
49. This depends on whether the prices and values of stocks and bonds issued by the same company
impact each other.
50. E.g., Marco Ventoruzzo, Comparing Insider Trading in the United States and in the European Union:
History and Recent Developments, 11 ECFR 554, __ (2014)
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of U.S. law in part to avoid conflicts between U.S. and foreign laws.51 The
explicit language of Dodd-Frank rebuts the presumption for the U.S. prohibition,
while the explicit language of MAR would do the same even if the European
Court of Justice (the high court for interpreting E.U. law) followed the
presumption.
By triggering jurisdiction based upon either conduct or effects within the
United States, Dodd-Frank employs two generally accepted grounds under
international law for a nation to apply its law.52 Insofar as MAR reaches trading
outside Europe based upon its impact on the price or value of securities traded in
Europe, MAR similarly employs jurisdiction based upon effects. Ironically,
European nations years ago argued that this sort of effects based jurisdiction was
inconsistent with international law.53 MAR shows that the Europeans have gotten
past this view, and, since it was the United States that pioneered jurisdiction
based upon economic effects within the nation,54 the United States is hardly in a
position to complain. Still, while effects allows MAR to reach trades outside
Europe that impact securities prices in Europe, MAR also seeks to ban insider
trading outside Europe in financial instruments whose prices are impacted by
prices in Europe. This appears to go beyond the generally accepted grounds
under international law for nations to apply their law. Tut tut.
Finally, some U.S. courts have invoked considerations of comity in order to
dismiss suits brought under U.S. laws in situations in which the challenged
conduct was legal where it occurred;55 and, of course, prosecutors might use their
discretion not to prosecute in such situations. Even if the European Court of
Justice recognizes comity, however, it is difficult to invoke the doctrine in the
face of MAR’s explicit language regarding the prohibition’s scope.
IV. NORMATIVE LESSONS FROM THE EXPERIMENT
While much of the normative debate over the insider trading prohibition asks
whether there should be any prohibition at all,56 the clash between the U.S. and
E.U. approaches takes the prohibition as a given and asks where to draw the line
regarding whom the prohibition reaches. Even resolving this narrower issue,
however, still depends upon one’s view of the purpose for the prohibition.
51. E.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
52. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 cmt. c
(1986).
53. E.g., Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL’Y INT’L
BUS. 1, 32-33 (1993) (discussing European objections to the application of U.S. antitrust law based upon the
economic effects in the United States of conduct outside the United States).
54. E.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945)(applying the
Sherman Act to a cartel limiting production outside the United States based upon the impact of increasing prices
inside the United States).
55. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 614 & n.31 (9th Cir. 1976).
56. E.g., Henry Manne, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
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A. Market Effects
Normative arguments about insider trading often focus on market effects.
Proponents of a ban argue that insider trading deters investors and raises the cost
of capital for companies.57 Opponents of a ban, or of a broad ban, commonly
argue that preventing persons from acting upon information relevant to the value
of securities leads to less accurate securities prices.58 Indeed, a primary argument
made by critics of the broad reach of the E.U. prohibition is that it will deter
parties from investigating companies by depriving researchers of rewards for
their efforts.59 This mirrors the Supreme Court’s express concern in Dirks that an
equal access rule deters legitimate efforts of stock analysts to ferret out important
information.60
The E.U.’s adoption of a broad prohibition seemingly provides a testing
ground for this concern. Any negative impacts on the efficient pricing of
securities on European markets (or any positive impacts on European securities
markets for that matter) have not been readily visible in the years since MAD.
Searching for less readily visible impacts would be an interesting project for
empirical research employing statistical methods. About all one can conclude at
this point is that the European experience does not support overly dire predictions
regarding the consequences of an equal access rule.
B. Fairness
Unfashionable as such fuzzy thinking might be, the prohibition on insider
trading may rest more upon a sense of what is unfair than upon market effects.
Fairness, however, is often in the eye of the beholder. Hence, the reason for
presenting the cases in Part II of this essay is not simply to demonstrate the
difference between the results under U.S. versus E.U. law through real examples,
but also to provide a real world context for asking what is fair.
Perhaps I have been reading too much recently about income inequality and
the growing class division in the United States.61 What strikes me, however, as
the common thread running through the cases in Part II is the division between
in-group haves and out-group have-nots. Large shareholders, and individuals
working in finance who are members of professional and social networks,
57. E.g., Joel Seligman, The Reformation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic Information,
73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1115 (1985).
58. E.g., Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Outsider Trading as an Incentive Device, 40 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 21, 35 (2006).
59. E.g., Sergio Gilotta, The Regulation of Outsider Trading in EU and the US, 13 EUR. CO. FIN. L. REV.
631, 664 (2016); Richard A. Booth, Insider Trading: There Oughta be a Law—or not, REG. 18, 21 (Fall 2015).
60. 463 U.S. at 658-59.
61. See, e.g., Richard V. Reeves, DREAM HOARDERS: HOW THE AMERICAN UPPER MIDDLE CLASS IS
LEAVING EVERYONE ELSE IN THE DUST, WHY THAT IS A PROBLEM, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2017);
Thomas Piketty, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014).
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obtained information as a result of their contacts not available to ordinary traders.
The result is a systematic transfer of wealth from the unconnected in the ordinary
middle class to the rich and to those in the financial industry.62 In short, the
trading in these cases presents a microcosm seemingly validating complaints that
a rigged system has produced growing income inequality in the United States, the
consequences of which we saw in the 2016 election.
Of course, one may object that of all the advantages possessed by those with
greater wealth or working in finance,63 insider trading may have the least impact
in producing income inequality. Still, there is a difference between insider
trading and the sorts of networking advantages that often open doors to
interviews, education, jobs and business opportunities. Trading on inside
information simply produces a zero sum wealth transfer from those without the
information to those who have it. By contrast, access to educational, employment
or business opportunities presumably still requires the recipient of the
opportunity to perform.64
Viewed in this light, the difference between the U.S. and E.U. insider
trading prohibitions is simply one manifestation of a broader difference between
current U.S. and European laws and cultural attitudes. For example, levels of
executive compensation in the United States versus Europe, as well as the
application of corporate law to challenges to executive compensation, also
illustrate this difference.65 The irony is that when I was growing up, the
stereotype of Europe was of economically divided societies and the image of the
United States was of a middle class nation.
C. Line Drawing
Not even the Europeans outlaw every trade in which one party knows more
than the other. So, Article 9 of MAR excludes a person’s knowledge of the
person’s own intention to purchase or sell securities from the definition of inside
information. Also, Paragraph 28 of MAR’s preamble excludes research and
estimates based upon publicly available data from being considered inside
information. Essentially, MAD and MAR, like the Second Circuit’s preChiarella rule, embody an equal access, not an equal information, rule.
Critics have argued that the particular line MAD and MAR draw between
inside and not inside information—or at least ambiguity about this line66—might
deter desirable use of information.67 No doubt any line can be over- or under62. See, e.g., Robert B. Reich, SAVING CAPITALISM: FOR THE MANY, NOT THE FEW 52-53 (2016).
63. See, e.g., Reeves, supra note 61.
64. One might question whether such broad societal fairness concerns justify harsh criminal penalties
(prison). This essay simply addresses the scope of the prohibition, not the question of sanctions.
65. E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Disney in a Comparative Light, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 453, 478-483 (2007).
66. Specifically, there can be room for dispute over what is publicly available data.
67. Gilotta, supra note 58 at [text accompanying notes 54-92 in his article].
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inclusive and can raise issues in its application. Still, it helps to start with the
right questions. The question of whether information consists of research and
estimates based upon publicly available data gets at the heart of fairness and
efficiency concerns insofar as it seeks to reward legitimate efforts. Fiduciary
duty—the ostensible linchpin of the U.S. approach—is simply the product of the
historical need to fit the prohibition of insider trading into a rubric built around
the word “fraud.”
V. CONCLUSION
In Chiarella, the U.S. Supreme Court took one fork in the road; in MAD and
MAR the European Union took the other. One fork leads in a small way toward a
more just and fair society.
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